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THE JUDICIAL VACANCY CONUNDRUM IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT*
Carl Tobiast
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
must resolve the largest and most complicated caseload of the
twelve regional appellate courts. Congress has authorized
twenty-eight active judges for the circuit, while the Judicial
Conference of the United States has recommended that
Congress approve nine additional judgeships for the court. The
Ninth Circuit currently has seven vacancies, four of which are
considered "judicial emergencies" because the openings have
remained unfilled for eighteen months, even as the size and
complexity of the court's civil and criminal dockets continue to
increase. President Bill Clinton submitted the names of
nominees for seven vacancies during 1997; however, the
Senate had confirmed no one for the court when the first
session of the 105th Congress recessed in mid-November. The
large number of empty seats and their prolonged character as
well as burgeoning appeals have required the Ninth Circuit to
cancel 600 oral arguments and to rely on many appellate and
district judges who are not active members of the court when
staffing panels. The factors above mean that the situation in
the Ninth Circuit may have reached crisis proportions. These
circumstances warrant analysis; this essay undertakes that
effort.
I first examine how conditions in the Ninth Circuit became
so critical, emphasizing caseload expansion and judicial
openings. The second part evaluates recent developments that
have led to vacancies in one-quarter of the total complement of
active judgeships which Congress has authorized for the court.
*©1997 Carl Tobias. All Rights Reserved.
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Finding that the growing number and complexity of civil and
criminal appeals filed in the Ninth Circuit and that the remote
possibility of expeditiously confirming judges for all of the
present openings seriously threaten appellate justice, I afford
suggestions which could remedy this conundrum.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONUNDRUM
The origins and development of the judicial vacancy dilem-
ma which currently exists in the Ninth Circuit might seem to
warrant comparatively limited examination in this essay be-
cause numerous aspects of the relevant history have been
explored elsewhere.1 Nevertheless, somewhat detailed treat-
ment is required because that type of assessment should en-
hance understanding of exactly how the present circumstances
arose and how they might be addressed.
The substantial number of openings which the Ninth Cir-
cuit now has and those empty seats' protracted nature exem-
plify considerably broader phenomena that have detrimentally
affected much of the federal court system. Nearly all of the
appellate courts and many of the federal districts have experi-
enced what may be characterized as a persistent vacancies
problem for approximately two decades. This difficulty, which
can be attributed principally to political phenomena, has ap-
parently resulted from the inability of presidents to nominate,
and the Senate to confirm, judges with sufficient expedition to
fill all of the existing openings.
The persistent vacancies problem traces its origins to the
1960s when Congress began enlarging federal court civil and
criminal jurisdiction.2 Increases in the number of civil causes
of action and federal crimes prompted significant growth in
civil and criminal district and appellate caseloads. Congress
responded to these mounting dockets by authorizing many
' See, e.g., Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); Carl Tobias, Fed.
eral Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. No. 2
(May 1998). See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
2 See, e.g., Bermant, supra note 1, at 323-33; Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari




additional district and appeals court judgeships. However,
Chief Executives and the Senate have encountered substantial
difficulty in approving federal judges for all of the empty judi-
cial seats partly because the bench's expansion has led to
greater numbers of openings which have arisen with increasing
frequency. For example, throughout much of the administra-
tions of President Bill Clinton and former President George
Bush, federal courts experienced numerous vacancies, there
are now more than eighty empty judgeships.
This persistent vacancies dilemma has applied with con-
siderable force to the Ninth Circuit for several reasons. The
court has encountered the largest appellate caseload since
1980, when Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit into two
appeals courts.3 Moreover, a 1978 statute authorized all re-
gional circuits with more than fifteen active judges to adopt
special procedures, namely administrative units and limited en
banc mechanisms, which would facilitate resolution of their
growing dockets.4 Another aspect of that legislation approved
ten new judgeships for the Ninth Circuit, while former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter undertook special efforts to fill the judicial
positions authorized and appointed thirteen members of the
court in 1979 and 1980.' Congressional passage of an addition-
al judgeships bill in 1984 brought the Ninth Circuit to its pres-
ent strength of twenty-eight active members,' which means
' See Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALK-
ER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE F=FTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988); HARVEY COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFIH CMCUIT
1891-1981 (1984).
' The statute reads:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute
itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as
may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, and may perform its en banc function by such number of mem-
bers of its en bane court as may be prescribed by rule of the court of
appeals.
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented
by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981).
5 Id. § 3, 92 Stat. 1632. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 236-84.
6 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 347 (1984).
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that the court has a much larger complement of judges than
any of the regional circuits and experiences considerably more
frequent vacancies.
There is also a current impasse over filling the approxi-
mately eighty present openings on the federal appellate and
district bench. The existing situation shares certain character-
istics of the persistent vacancies problem but differs in some
important respects. The current conundrum seems attributable
principally to political factors which derive substantially from
different political parties' control of the presidency and the
Senate. The dilemma also partially results from the inability
or unwillingness of officials in the Executive Branch and the
Senate to discharge their respective responsibilities for nomi-
nating and confirming candidates to the federal courts.
Regardless of who created, or might have prevented, the
persistent problem and the present impasse, both of these
developments have meant that there are now more than eighty
vacancies on the federal appellate and district courts and sev-
en openings on the Ninth Circuit, half of which constitute
judicial emergencies. The permanent conundrum and the cur-
rent problem have imposed many disadvantages. Numerous
federal district courts have experienced backlogs on their civil
dockets, while some district judges have not conducted a single
civil trial in the last two years.
Most of the regional appeals courts have had to depend
more often on judges who are not active members of the courts,
a phenomenon which can undermine collegiality and even
erode consistency in circuit precedent. Appellate court judges
have also placed greater reliance on support staff to help them.
Almost all of the appeals courts have correspondingly limited
the percentage of oral arguments and published decisions that
they have afforded, while a few have even postponed oral argu-
ments.
The longstanding judicial vacancies difficulty and the
current dilemma have had some of the detrimental effects
which I described above and additional deleterious impacts on
the Ninth Circuit. I examine in the next section the large num-





For much of the period since 1978, when Congress autho-
rized a substantial increase in the number of judgeships on the
Ninth Circuit, the court has experienced comparatively few
vacancies. The openings only rose to significant levels and the
seats remained empty for prolonged periods during 1995 when
filling those judgeships became inextricably intertwined with
proposals to split the Ninth Circuit.
In May 1995, Republican Party senators who represent
states of the Pacific Northwest mounted the fifth serious effort
since 1983 to divide the court.7 The Senate members intro-
duced a bill that would have placed the five Northwestern
states in a new Twelfth Circuit and would have left the re-
maining states and territories of the existing Ninth Circuit in
that court.' Soon after the measure's introduction, Senator
Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) announced that he would place a hold
on all nominees to the Ninth Circuit until Congress bifurcated
the court.9 Senator Burns only removed this hold in early 1996
when the Senate confirmed Judge A. Wallace Tashima and
Judge Sidney Thomas to the court. However, no judges re-
ceived appointments to the Ninth Circuit in the remainder of
the 1996 presidential election year or throughout 1997, the
first year of the Clinton Administration's second term.
During 1996 and 1997, eight active judges on the court
decided to assume senior status or to retire, thus creating
vacancies. Both Democratic and Republican presidents had
appointed the jurists. Some of the judges were apparently
following or attempting to honor an informal tradition of as-
suming senior status or resigning during the administration of
a Chief Executive of the same political party as the president
who named the judges. For example, this phenomenon could
explain why a few Democratic appointees assumed senior sta-
' See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995); Thomas
E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22
AIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990). See generally Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Cir-
cuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995).
See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995).
9See Montana Senator Jeopardizes Candidacies for 9th Circuit, S.F. DAILY J.,
June 8, 1995, at 1.
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tus rather early in 1996, thereby ostensibly enabling President
Clinton to name their successors. Several Republican appoint-
ees who may have awaited the 1996 election returns to ascer-
tain whether a Republican might capture the White House
could have decided correspondingly to assume senior status
once that eventuality failed to materialize, rather than wait an
additional four years.'0
Several reasons explain why only two judges have secured
appointment to the Ninth Circuit from May 1995 until 1998.
First, the Senate did not confirm any nominees to the court in
1995 after Senator Burns placed his hold on confirmation be-
cause one member of that body can delay the entire Senate's
action under the chamber's unanimous consent procedure.
When Senator Burns lifted his hold in early 1996, the Senate
confirmed Judges Tashima and Thomas.
However, the Senate approved no additional nominees for
the Ninth Circuit during 1996." Perhaps the most important
explanation for inaction was that a presidential election oc-
curred in 1996. This meant that during the first five months of
the year, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who was serving as
Senate Majority Leader and attempting to secure the Republi-
can presidential nomination, was apparently reluctant to
schedule floor votes on appellate court nominees lest he evince
a lack of confidence in his own presidential aspirations.
Once Senator Dole resigned from the Senate and Senator
Trent Lott (R-Miss.) succeeded him, there ensued a period
when Senator Lott was apparently proceeding with caution in
mastering his responsibilities as Majority Leader. By the time
that the new Senate Majority Leader was prepared to schedule
floor debate and floor votes on nominees, it was mid-summer of
an election year when the confirmation process has traditional-
ly slowed in anticipation of the presidential election. Republi-
can Party hopes that Senator Dole might capture the White
House and afford the GOP the opportunity to fill existing judi-
"0 An active judge becomes eligible to assume senior status when the sum of
the judge's age and years of service equals eighty. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
," A few nominees received Committee hearings or Committee votes, but none
received full Senate consideration.
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cial vacancies and Senator Lott's reluctance to exhibit insuffi-
cient confidence in the Dole candidacy by promptly processing
judicial nominees may have additionally delayed confirmation.
In any event, during the summer, the Republican and
Democratic leadership in the Senate reached an agreement on
the confirmation process whereby the Senate would consider
one nominee per day until the Labor Day recess. That agree-
ment enabled the Senate to confirm thirteen judges for the
district court bench. Some appeals court nominees did have
Judiciary Committee hearings in 1996, but none of the judges
receiving appointment were named members of any appellate
court, including the Ninth Circuit.
During March 1996, proponents of the proposal to bifur-
cate the Ninth Circuit concluded that they lacked the requisite
votes to pass the measure.' These Republican senators,
therefore, agreed on a compromise proposal which would have
authorized a national commission to evaluate appellate courts.
The measure easily passed the Senate, but the proposal lan-
guished in the House. Congress did appropriate $500,000 for
the study; however, it failed to enact authorizing legislation.'
In 1997, several study commission bills were introduced in
the House and the Senate.14 On June 3, the House approved
proposed legislation which would have authorized a study.'
In late July, the Senate passed an appropriations rider that
would have divided the Ninth Circuit.16 In November, Con-
gress adopted and President Clinton signed a measure which
provided for a national study of the appellate courts, with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit.'
I rely in this sentence and the next on Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should
Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 589 (1997); see also 142 CONG.
REC. S2219-S2303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996).
See 142 CONG. REc. H11,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
14 See, eg., S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 283, 105th Cong. (1997); H!R 639,
105th Cong. (1997).
11 See H P 908, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Carl Tobias, House Authorizes Ap-
pellate Court Study Commission, 80 JUDICATURE 292 (1997).
16 See S. 1022, 105th Cong., § 305 (1997).
17 See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997); see also Carl
Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L REV.
189 (1997); Carl Tobias, Congress Authorizes Appellate Study Panel, 81 JUDICATURE
125 (1997). The authorization of that study should temporarily eliminate the issue




During 1997, no judge secured appointment to the Ninth
Circuit. The inability or unwillingness to approve judges for
the court can be ascribed to numerous individuals and entities
with responsibility for judicial selection. Some observers have
attributed the delay in naming judges to the machinations
which involved proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit,"8 al-
though it is impossible to prove that senators who favor divi-
sion may have been employing delay or refusal to confirm
judges as a tactic for imposing pressure on the court and fos-
tering its bifurcation. For example, the larger number of open-
ings that the court experiences and the longer that they re-
main open, the more the court's judges might feel that they
should accede to division and the greater difficulty they will
encounter in promptly processing appeals.
Another explanation for the dearth of judges appointed to
the Ninth Circuit is the current impasse over the approval of
federal judges for all eighty openings. For example, President
Clinton may have submitted at a regular pace an insufficient
number of nominees whom Republican senators considered
acceptable, especially early in 1997. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, could have
permitted too few hearings and Committee votes on the can-
didates whom the Chief Executive tendered. Senator Lott, for
his part, appeared to schedule infrequently floor votes and
debates on nominees who had received favorable Committee
votes. In short, all who were responsibile for judicial selection
probably could have done more to expedite the process.
These ideas apply with greater specificity to the Ninth
Circuit. For example, on January 7, 1997, President Clinton
renominated three individuals whom the Senate had earlier
failed to confirm.' However, the administration did not sub-
mit another nominee until late June, anda fifth person during
late July, while tendering the names of two additional people
in November.20 In fairness, the Chief Executive may have
"' See, e.g., Carol M. Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to Carve Up 9th Circuit.
NW States Would be in New District, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al; David
G. Savage, Debate Rises Over Proposal to Break Up Appeals Court, L.A. TIm.s,
Sept. 21, 1997, at A3.
"' They were Professor William Fletcher, Margaret McKeown, and District
Judge Richard Paez. See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President
Clinton Nominates Twenty-two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997).
20 The late June nominee was District Judge James Ware and the late July
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seen little reason to nominate more individuals promptly, giv-
en the slow pace at which the Senate was processing candi-
dates. The Senate Judiciary Committee correspondingly con-
ducted hearings on one of the seven nominees for the court
who subsequently requested that his name be withdrawn from
consideration2 ' and on a second person whom the Committee
approved but on whom the Senate failed to vote before it re-
cessed.'
There have also been disputes over filling particular va-
cancies. For example, Republican senators from Arizona and
Washington argued that they must participate in recommend-
ing candidates for openings in their states and have even in-
sisted that they are entitled to make the suggestions.? These
machinations seriously delayed nominations for vacancies in
Arizona and Washington, although accord was apparently
reached and the Chief Executive submitted nominees for both
empty seats in November.'
The large number and protracted nature of the openings
have had numerous detrimental effects. The vacancies have
imposed enormous pressure on active appeals court judges, the
appellate judges who have assumed senior status, and the ac-
tive and senior district judges who sit in the Ninth Circuit. For
nominee was Oregon Supreme Court Justice Susan Graber. See The White House,
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Ware to the Appellate Bench
(June 27, 1997); The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton
Nominates Graber to the Appellate Bench (July 30, 1997); The White House, Office
of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Siluerman to the Appellate Bench
(Nov. 8, 1997); The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nom-
inates Gould to the Appellate Bench (Nov. 8, 1997).
2" This was Judge Ware. See supra note 20; see also David G. Savage &
Maura Dolan, Judge Admits Tale of Brother's Death Was a Lie, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1997, at Al.
'This was Magistrate Judge Silverman. See supra note 20; see al infra
notes 24, 29.30 and accompanying text. The Senate confirmed Judge Silverman in
January 1998. See Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998,
at 2C.
' See, e.g., Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOM!A NE*S
TPIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997, at B1; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 1; see also 143 CONG. EC. S2538, S2541
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (suggesting GOP senators may
have so intimated).
24 These nominees were Magistrate Judge Barry Silverman and Ronald Gould.
See supra notes 20, 22; see also infra notes 30.31 and accompanying text.
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example, the active and senior appellate judges have heard
more oral arguments and authored more opinions than they
would have were the court at full strength.
The circuit may also have had to invoke numerous mea-
sures that enable it to resolve expanding dockets with insuffi-
cient resources. For example, the deficient resources might
have prompted the court to grant fewer oral arguments or to
issue written decisions in a smaller percentage of cases. The
situation concomitantly could have led judges to rely more
substantially on court staff, such as staff attorneys and law
clerks. Judges may even have had less time to review petitions
and briefs, to prepare for oral arguments and to confer on,
draft, circulate and finalize opinions.
Symptomatic of certain difficulties that are enumerated
above is the Ninth Circuit's substantially increased reliance on
judges who are not active members of the court to participate
on three-judge panels. The Ninth Circuit has a long tradition
of depending on its own senior appeals and district judges and
active district judges as well as appellate and district judges
who sit in other appeals courts, but has resorted to that prac-
tice with increasing frequency since 1995. Indeed, a judge of
the Court of International Trade recently sat on the court. It is
difficult to identify the effects of increasing reliance on judges
who are not active members of the Ninth Circuit. However,
dependence on these judges may undermine collegiality, a
phenomenon which is said to expedite appellate dispositions.
Reliance on "outside" judges correspondingly might have re-
duced coherence in the law of the circuit because they could be
less familiar not only with one another but also with the
court's substantive decisionmaking and its traditions.
The phenomena that I examined earlier might also delay
the Ninth Circuit's disposition of appeals, thus complicating
the efforts of a court which already experiences considerable
difficulty in expediting resolution of its enormous docket. Any
court that is attempting to operate with only two-thirds of its
authorized complement will encounter even greater problems
in promptly concluding appellate disputes. Indeed, numerous
[Vol. 63: 1283
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factors which I considered already have compelled the Ninth
Circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments at great cost to the court,
lawyers, and litigants.1
In sum, the large number and lengthy character of the
judicial vacancies which now exist in the Ninth Circuit have
apparently had numerous disadvantageous effects on the court.
These circumstances mean that all three branches of the feder-
al government, but especially President Clinton and the Sen-
ate, must work cooperatively in attempting to appoint judges
for all of the present openings as promptly as possible.
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Republican Party senators who comprise a majority in the
upper chamber should institute numerous measures to expe-
dite the filling of the nine vacancies which currently exist on
the Ninth Circuit. The Senate Judiciary Committee and its
chair, the Senate Majority Leader, and individual Republican
senators, particularly lawmakers who represent states situated
in the Ninth Circuit where openings exist, could implement
these approaches. First, and perhaps foremost, they should no
longer consider the controversy over the Ninth Circuit's possi-
ble bifurcation as an impediment to confirming judges, because
congressional approval of a study commission which will em-
phasize the court removes the issue of Ninth Circuit division
as a reason for delaying appointments.
The Judiciary Committee and Senator Hatch should con-
tinue employing the type of concerted efforts which they under-
took between the time that the Senate returned from its Au-
gust recess and the mid-November date on which the first
session of the 105th Congress recessed. This work enabled the
Senate to confirm three times as many judges during the final
two and one-half months of the session as the Senate had
approved between January and early September of the same
year.
' See, eg., Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37;
Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Liues, Justice On Hold, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also id. (stating that 6th Circuit canceled 60
arguments); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1.
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Now that the second session of the 105th Congress has
convened, the Committee and the chair should schedule hear-
ings promptly for the nominees whom the Committee has in-
vestigated but did not accord hearings during 1997 and for the
nominees whom President Clinton has proposed, or will sub-
mit, in 1998. This might require the Committee and Senator
Hatch to alter somewhat the schedule that they followed in the
first session and throughout the 104th Congress, whereby only
one appeals court nominee testified at each hearing, which was
typically held once a month. 6 The Committee may need to
schedule multiple hearings every month or permit testimony of
more than one appellate court nominee in a specific hearing.
The Committee could consider holding a special hearing for
several nominees to the Ninth Circuit or at least contemplate
moving some of these individuals forward in the queue. The
Committee might even eschew hearings for noncontroversial
nominees because the proceedings are essentially ceremonial,
although the symbolic and actual significance of appeals court
judgeships may make some senators reluctant to follow this
approach. The critical situation that currently exists in the
Ninth Circuit may justify the invocation of these efforts.
The Committee and its chair should schedule hearings and
Committee votes on all nominees, even if one or more senators
object to specific candidates. These nominees should be permit-
ted to testify and to have the Committee debate and vote on
their fitness to serve. President Clinton is concomitantly enti-
tled to forward the nominations of people whom he believes
will be excellent federal judges, while both the President and
the nominees should be able to expect that the individuals will
receive hearings on the merits of their candidacies and fair
votes. Subject to institutional constraints and traditional un-
derstandings of the Senate's role in giving advice and consent,
the Committee and members can freely and rigorously ques-
tion nominees and vote against those whom the lawmakers
find unfit for federal appellate service. For example, senators
" See Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L.
REV. 309, 318 (1996); see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second
Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997).
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who are concerned that nominees might become activist judges
if approved may want to probe in confirmation hearings
individuals' potential to so behave once on the bench.'
It will generally be better to have issues, such as those
enumerated above, aired in a public forum, particularly if
specific nominees favor this approach. Nevertheless, some
candidates may prefer that these questions be considered in
private or the potential for embarrassment or waste of resourc-
es could make that public treatment less desirable. However,
these situations should be the exception, and should be the
subject of private negotiations between the chair, the Clinton
Administration and the individual nominee.
The Senate Majority Leader must implement actions
which will expedite full Senate consideration of nominees who
secure Judiciary Committee approval. For instance, Senator
Lott should schedule floor votes promptly after he is notified of
favorable Committee action. To the extent that delay can be
ascribed to controversy over specific candidates, particularly
dissatisfaction of the Majority Leader or individual senators,
Senator Lott might permit increased floor debate and final
votes on these nominees. For example, the discussion which
preceded Judge Merrick Garland's confirmation apparently
fostered open and healthy interchange on the Senate floor.
President Clinton could institute measures which might
expedite the confirmation of judges for the numerous vacancies
that presently exist on the Ninth Circuit. The Chief Executive
expeditiously nominated persons for two empty seats once the
Senate returned for the second session of the 105th Con-
' See, e.g., Hearings on Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact Before the
Senate Judiciary Constitution Subcomm., 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC.
S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
See 143 CONG. REC. S251541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Eva tL
Rodriguez, Garland: A Centrist Choice, LEGAL TMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at 1. Insofar
as the Senate Majority Leader has premised floor votes for judicial nominee3 on
other contingencies, such as President Clinton's submission of names for the Fed-
eral Election Commission openings, the importance of filling court vacancies sug-
gests that Senator Lott cease this practice. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 75.
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gress. 2' The Clinton Administration should promptly nomi-
nate individuals for the two openings as to which no nominees
have been tendered.
President Clinton can best facilitate the filling of the cur-
rent vacancies by certain practices that he followed near the
end of the first session of the 105th Congress. The administra-
tion must identify and nominate individuals with excellent
qualifications who will prove acceptable to senators from the
states in which the opening will be filled by conferring with
those lawmakers about candidates. Illustrative are the nomi-
nations in Arizona of Magistrate Judge Barry Silverman,
whom the state's two Republican senators seemingly found
acceptable and of Ronald Gould, a distinguished practitioner
from Seattle, Washington, whom Senator Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.) apparently supported."0 Indeed, the Chief Executive
nominated Magistrate Judge Silverman in early November, the
Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on the nominee on
November 9, and the full Committee voted favorably on
Silverman three days later.3 However, Congress recessed be-
fore the Senate could consider the nominee.3 2
President Clinton, therefore, must search for and nominate
people who are intelligent, independent, industrious and have
measured judicial temperament. The Chief Executive may
want to consider nominating persons who have moderate polit-
ical perspectives, as did most of his nominees during his first
29 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates
Berzon to the Appellate Bench (Jan. 27, 1998); The White House, Office of the
Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Wardlaw to the Appellate Bench (Jan. 27,
1998).
30 See supra notes 20, 24.
31 I rely in this sentence and the next on Senate Dems Put Judge Pick on
Hold, ARIZONA REPUBLIc, Nov. 15, 1997, at B1; see also Adrianne Flynn, Arizona
Lawmakers Post Wins as Session Ends; Actions Include Court Nominee, Key Bills
Passed, ARIZONA REPUBLc, Nov. 13, 1997, at A2; supra notes 20, 24 and accompa-
nying text.
2 The Senate did confirm Judge Silverman shortly after the second session of
the 105th Congress convened. See Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, THE TUSCON
CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C.
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Administration,'s because Senator Hatch and numerous other
Republican senators have clearly stated that they will not
confirm nominees who promise to be "activist judges.'
Prior judicial service, although not a prerequisite, is a
desirable attribute which some nominees will possess. For
instance, Judge Wallace Tashima was a highly-regarded judge
of the Central District of California before his recent elevation
to the Ninth Circuit, and Judge Susan Graber had been a
distinguished member of the Oregon Supreme Court since
1990. Individuals who have previously served on the bench
afford the advantage of that experience, while federal district
judges have already received Senate confirmation. The Chief
Executive may want to accord special consideration to present-
ly-sitting district judges, such as Judge Sonia Sotomayor,
whom Republican presidents appointed, because the Republi-
can majority in the Senate may be inclined to view these indi-
viduals favorably.'
President Clinton should closely consult with Senator
Hatch regarding potential nominees. The administration must
seek the chair's counsel and suggestions, although it need not
always follow his advice. The Chief Executive should also com-
municate with other members of the Judiciary Committee and
senators who represent states in which openings exist, because
the lawmakers can play important roles in the confirmation
process, as they apparently did in Arizona and Washington. 8
If the above approaches, which may fairly be characterized
as conciliatory, do not prove efficacious, President Clinton may
want to entertain and employ less cooperative measures. For
instance, he might rely on the presidency as a bully pulpit to
blame the Ninth Circuit vacancies on Republican senators, or
for cajoling or shaming the legislators into expediting appoint-
ments. The Chief Executive may even force the issue of de-
' See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many
Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); Ronald Stidham et al, The Voting
Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996).
' See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
I See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates
Sotomayor to the Appellate Bench (June 25, 1997); see also supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
" See supra notes 23-24, 30-31 and accompanying text.
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layed selection by taking it to the American people. Related
means for breaking the impasse might be the submission of
nominees for all seven current openings or reliance on recess
appointments, 7 each of which could pressure the Senate to
process nominees by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted
vacancies threaten justice and the importance of promptly
choosing more judges.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit currently has vacancies in seven of the
court's twenty-eight active judgeships that Congress has autho-
rized, while the appeals court confronts a docket which contin-
ues to increase in size and complexity. The failure or inability
to fill these openings has threatened the delivery of appellate
justice in the West. President Clinton and the Senate must
work closely together so that they may expeditiously appoint
judges to these empty seats.
37 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 49-52.
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